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The current work investigated the extent to which children (N=171 6- to 8-year-olds) and adults (N = 94) view
punishment as redemptive. In Study 1, children—but not adults—reported that “mean” individuals became
“nicer” after one severe form of punishment (incarceration). Moreover, adults expected “nice” individuals’
moral character to worsen following punishment; however, we did not find that children expected such a
change. Study 2 extended these findings by showing that children view “mean” individuals as becoming
“nicer” following both severe (incarceration) and relatively minor (time-out) punishments, suggesting that the
pattern of results from Study 1 generalizes across punishment types. Together, these studies indicate that chil-
dren—but not adults—may view punishment as a vehicle for redemption.
In the novel The 7½ Deaths of Evelyn Hardcastle (Tur-
ton, 2018), readers become acquainted with Aiden
Bishop, a fictional character who describes his time
spent at Blackheath Manor, a futuristic prison.
While at Blackheath Manor, Aiden muses that put-
ting people behind bars “can’t build better men”
and “can only break what goodness remains” (p.
436). In other words, Aiden believes that this form
of punishment is ineffective in catalyzing moral
improvement.
Here, we join other scholars in conceptualizing
punishment as a “behavior aimed at those who
cause harm or violate social norms” (Deutchman,
Bračič, Raihani, & McAuliffe, in press, p. 2). Schol-
ars sometimes describe punishment as “costly,”
meaning that punishers pay a cost (e.g., putting
themselves at risk for retaliation) for a transgressor
to incur a cost (e.g., loss of resources; Fehr &
Gächter, 2002; McAuliffe, Jordan, & Warneken,
2015; Salali, Juda, & Henrich, 2015). Prior work has
delineated how punishment differs from other
responses to perceived moral transgression, such as
logical consequences. Whereas punishment need
not directly address the transgression-induced out-
come (e.g., Mageau et al., 2018; Nelsen, 1985; Robi-
chaud & Mageau, 2020), logical consequences
require transgressors to respond to the harm they
have caused (Ginott, 1965). For example, parents
who employ a punitive approach to transgression
may decide to take away their child’s television
privileges because she purposefully broke a differ-
ent object. This approach qualifies as punishment
because the parent took away a privilege (watching
television) that was unrelated to the child’s misdeed
(breaking something else). In contrast, parents who
uphold a logical consequences approach to trans-
gression may require their child to repair an object
that she purposefully broke.
While punishment is just one possible response
to perceived moral transgression, it served as the
focus of the current studies because it is a common
reaction to wrongdoing. Specifically, Study 1
focused on children’s and adults’ views about the
impact of one particularly severe form of punish-
ment (incarceration) on moral character. Of course,
incarceration is just one type of punishment, and
laypeople’s reasoning about incarceration may dif-
fer from their reasoning about other forms of pun-
ishment. For example, adults may be especially
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pessimistic about the impact of incarceration on
moral character because they have negative stereo-
types about what it is like to spend time in prison
or jail. Nevertheless, the current work initially
probed views about the impact of incarceration on
moral character because such punishment is a com-
mon response to perceived transgression within the
United States criminal legal system (e.g., Alexander,
2012; Forman, 2017; Travis, Western, & Redburn,
2014; Van Cleve, 2016). Study 2 compared incarcer-
ation with a less severe form of punishment (time-
out) to probe the extent to which results general-
ized across different forms of punishment.
Together, these studies afforded us the opportunity
to make theoretical contributions spanning develop-
mental psychology, moral cognition, and experi-
mental jurisprudence. We outline these
contributions in the sections below.
How Might Age-Related Changes in Socio-Moral
Cognition Shape Views About the Impact of Punishment
on Moral Character?
Adults living in the United States may under-
stand punishment as communicating negative infor-
mation about punished individuals’ moral character
(Dunlea & Heiphetz, in press; Kleinfeld, 2016; Van
Cleve, 2016; Yankah, 2004). Although people some-
times describe incarceration as paying a debt for a
moral wrong, predominant cultural narratives in
the United States sometimes portray those directly
implicated in the criminal legal system as morally
bankrupt and forever unable to repay their debt.
Such individuals are often depicted “as remaining
criminal for life” and as having “inelastic” immoral
character (Yankah, 2004, p. 1027; see also Dunlea &
Heiphetz, in press; Kleinfeld, 2016; Van Cleve,
2016). As such, adults may view punishment as
ineffective in catalyzing moral improvement. How-
ever, the developmental trajectory of this view
remains unclear.
The current work recruited elementary school-
aged children and adults in order to test between
two competing possibilities regarding how views
about the impact of punishment on moral character
may change with age. On the one hand, elementary
schoolers may be less likely than adults to view
punishment as effectively improving moral charac-
ter. This possibility is rooted in past work on psy-
chological essentialism—the tendency to view others’
characteristics as stemming from internal, immuta-
ble, biologically-based “essences” (Gelman, 2003;
Medin & Ortony, 1989). Although both children
and adults endorse the idea that essences exist (for
a review, see Rhodes & Mandalaywala, 2017), ele-
mentary schoolers typically report more essentialist
perspectives than do adults (e.g., Chalik, Leslie, &
Rhodes, 2017; Heiphetz, Gelman, & Young, 2017;
Hussak & Cimpian, 2019; Taylor, Rhodes, & Gel-
man, 2009). Crucially, recent work has documented
age-related decreases in essentialist reasoning
within the moral domain (for a review, see Hei-
phetz, 2020). Such studies have shown that children
are more likely than adults to attribute punishment
to an internal “bad” essence (Dunlea & Heiphetz,
2020) and to perceive moral badness as arising from
an internal, unchanging source (Heiphetz, 2019).
Given that children are especially prone to viewing
human characteristics—including moral character—
as innate and unchangeable, children in elementary
school may be less likely than adults to report that
punishment is effective in catalyzing moral growth.
On the other hand, elementary schoolers may be
more likely than adults to view punishment as an
effective mechanism to improve moral character.
This possibility is consistent with work showing
that children in elementary school are typically
more optimistic than adults (Boseovski, 2010;
Boseovski & Lee, 2006; Heyman & Giles, 2004;
Lockhart, Nakashima, Inagaki, & Keil, 2008). In one
study probing views of trait change outside the
domain of punishment, children were more likely
than adults to report that people’s negative quali-
ties change for the better over time (i.e., to perceive
that mean people will become nicer over time,
Lockhart et al., 2008). Though past experiments
have not focused on whether children view punish-
ment as catalyzing positive change, sociological
data provide initial support favoring this possibil-
ity. In one diary study probing children’s justifica-
tions for punishment (Twum-Danso Imoh, 2013),
several children spoke of punishment as a vehicle
for moral improvement. For example, one child
reported that, without punishment, an unruly child
will likely “grow up to become a bad person” (p.
479). One interpretation of these types of responses
is that punishment can transform an individual
with immoral character into someone who is virtu-
ous. Speaking more directly to this interpretation,
another respondent noted that “punishment is one
of the ways through which a child can be corrected,
so it is good” (p. 479).
In addition to testing between these competing
developmental possibilities, the current work builds
on theoretical models of punishment. Previous
research suggests a unidirectional link between per-
ceived immoral character and punitive outcomes:
whereas perceived immorality typically augments
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the likelihood of punitive outcomes (e.g., receiving
blame), perceived goodness attenuates such out-
comes (Nadler, 2012; Nadler & McDonnell, 2011).
For instance, in one line of work, participants
learned about two people—one described as
“good” and the other as “bad”—who both commit-
ted the same transgression (starting a deadly fire,
Nadler & McDonnell, 2011). Although each individ-
ual committed the same transgression, participants
reported that the “bad” person was more responsi-
ble, more blameworthy, and less likable than the
“good” person. In other words, perceived immoral
character increased punitive outcomes even when
behavior was held constant. This finding suggests a
directional link between perceived immorality and
punishment-related outcomes. If children and
adults perceive punishment as changing moral
character, this would suggest that the link between
perceived immorality and punishment is bidirec-
tional. In sum, the present work adds to past theo-
retical models of punishment by investigating the
extent to which punishment impacts perceived
moral character.
Why Study Punishment in the Context of the Criminal
Legal System?
The current work used the criminal legal system
as an example domain in which to investigate chil-
dren’s and adults’ views about punishment. Some
scholars working in the legal tradition conceptual-
ize punishment as “expressive,” i.e., as both an
action and a mechanism for social messaging (e.g.,
Duff, 2011; Feinberg, 1965; Kahan, 1996; Markel,
2011; Murphy & Hampton, 1988). For instance,
scholars have argued that punishment expresses
information about community norms (Duff, 2011;
Markel, 2011) or social hierarchies (i.e., the social
standing of victims relative to transgressors, Mur-
phy & Hampton, 1988). Importantly, scholars writ-
ing on the expressive function of punishment
typically conceptualize punishment as severe. For
instance, punishment has been equated with “hard
treatment” (Feinberg, 1965, p. 397) and depicted as
requiring “pain or other consequences normally
considered unpleasant” (Hart, 1959, p. 4). Given
that severe punishment is typically confined to for-
mal systems such as incarceration, scholarship dis-
cussing the expressive function of punishment is
often couched within the criminal legal system con-
text.
Although this past work has argued that punish-
ment carries communicative weight, few programs
of research within psychology have empirically
tested how laypeople interpret punishment’s mes-
sages. The studies that have employed experimental
methods to answer related questions, however,
have largely focused on testing adults (Bilz, 2016;
Ho, Cushman, Littman, & Austerweil, 2019; Oki-
moto & Wenzel, 2011; for an exception with chil-
dren, see Bregant, Shaw, & Kinzler, 2016). The
current work leveraged experimental methods to
investigate how both children and adults reason
about the impact of one particularly severe punish-
ment (incarceration) on moral character. Specifi-
cally, we tested 6- to 8-year-old children and adults
in the same experimental paradigm. Testing ele-
mentary schoolers was important for two main rea-
sons. First, testing children in this age range
allowed us to extend, and compare our results
with, previous work examining elementary school-
ers’ essentialism (e.g., Heiphetz, 2019; Hussak &
Cimpian, 2019; Taylor et al., 2009) and, separately,
their optimism (e.g., Boseovski, 2010). As men-
tioned in the section above, these separate bodies of
scholarship suggest that both essentialist reasoning
and optimism are high during the elementary
school years. Thus, testing children in this age
range allowed us to examine the extent to which
children’s optimism overwhelms their tendency to
believe human characteristics such as “badness” are
immutable. Second, past work suggests that 6- to 8-
year-olds can reason and respond to questions
about individuals who have been implicated in the
criminal legal system (Bregant et al., 2016; Dunlea
& Heiphetz, 2020; Dunlea, Wolle, & Heiphetz,
2020). As such, we were able to ask children ques-
tions about individuals who received a relatively
severe form of punishment (incarceration) that is
specific to the criminal legal system context and
compare their inferences about such individuals
with their inferences about people who received a
relatively less severe form of punishment (time-
out).
In addition to the theoretical contributions laid
out above, studying punishment in the context of
the criminal legal system addresses an important
topic that is understudied in psychology. Scholar-
ship at the intersection of psychology and law has
documented discrimination and prejudice toward
those who have been implicated in the criminal
legal system (e.g., Banks, Eberhardt, & Ross, 2006;
Haney, 2012; Moore, Stuewig, & Tangney, 2016;
Richardson & Goff, 2013). While this literature has
underscored the far-reaching implications of legal
punishment in the United States, relatively less
work has examined the psychological underpin-
nings of why formerly incarcerated individuals may
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experience such negativity long after experiencing
incarceration. This negativity may partially arise
from the view that incarceration within the U.S.
context fails to improve people (Dunlea & Hei-
phetz, in press; Kleinfeld, 2016; Van Cleve, 2016;
Yankah, 2004). The current work addressed this
possibility by examining how laypeople view those
who have experienced incarceration.
Overview of Current Work
The current work examined laypeople’s views
about the impact of certain types of punishment on
perceived moral character. Study 1 examined this
topic by asking children and adults to indicate the
extent to which “nice” and, separately, “mean”
individuals’ moral qualities changed following one
particularly severe type of punishment—incarcera-
tion. By testing children and adults in the same
paradigm, the present work provided insight into
how judgments about the impact of punishment on
moral character change throughout development.
Study 2 built on the results of Study 1 by investi-
gating the extent to which children’s views general-
ize across different forms of punishment.
Study 1
Study 1 investigated the extent to which children
and adults view punishment as driving moral
change. To do so, we told participants about both a
morally good (“nice”) and, separately, a morally
bad (“mean”) individual. Participants in the experi-
mental condition learned that these individuals
were punished for breaking the law, whereas the
participants in the control condition learned that
these individuals went on a business trip. Partici-
pants indicated how morally good each individual
would be both during and after the incarceration or
trip. Data for this study were collected between Fall
2017 and Spring 2018.
Method
Participants
Participants included 94 children between 6 and
8 years old (Mage = 6.92 years, SDage = 0.79 years;
57% female, 43% male). Children’s parents com-
pleted a demographic questionnaire in which they
identified their children as White or European-
American (45%), Black or African American (17%),
Asian or Asian American (14%), multiracial (14%)
and “other” (6%); the remaining parents did not
answer this question. Parents reported their child’s
ethnicity using a separate question, and 18% of par-
ents identified their children as Hispanic or Latinx.
Data from five additional children were excluded
because they did not comprehend the experimental
items. Children were recruited from a departmental
database and from a children’s museum in a large
city in the northeastern United States. Here and in
Study 2, families signed up for inclusion in the
departmental database either in person (at public
street fairs, public parks, and the aforementioned
children’s museum) or by visiting our laboratory’s
website. Given our recruitment strategy, any fami-
lies with eligible children could participate. All chil-
dren received a small prize (e.g., a sticker) for
participating.
Participants also included 94 adults between 18
and 52 years old (Mage = 22.68 years, SDage =
5.74 years; 66% female, 34% male). Adult partici-
pants self-identified as White or European-Ameri-
can (44%), Black or African American (19%), Asian
or Asian American (26%), Native American or Paci-
fic Islander (1%), multiracial (7%) or “other” (3%).
Additionally, 10% of adults self-identified as His-
panic or Latinx. Data from three additional adults
were excluded because they did not correctly
answer an attention check item asking them to
describe any of the characters presented throughout
the study. Adults were recruited through the psy-
chology department’s participant pool and from the
greater metropolitan community. Adults who par-
ticipated via the university participant pool
received 0.5 credits, and adults from the greater
community received a small prize (e.g., a piece of
candy) for participating.
Thirty-four adults reported that they knew at
least one person who has previously served time in
a jail or prison. Additionally, seven parents
reported that their child knew at least one person
who has experienced incarceration. However, no
significant differences in responses emerged
between individuals who knew at least one incar-
cerated individual and those who did not (see Sup-
porting Information for relevant exploratory
analyses concerning this variable). We also con-
ducted a series of exploratory analysis examining
the extent to which participant race and ethnicity
predicted participant responses. Although members
of racial and ethnic minority groups often have
very different experiences in the criminal legal sys-
tem than majority group members (e.g., Alexander,
2012; Banks et al., 2006; Richardson & Goff, 2013;
Van Cleve, 2016), neither of these variables reliably
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predicted participants’ responses (see Supporting
Information for relevant analyses).
Procedure
Here and in Study 2, an experimenter inter-
viewed children individually in a quiet room
located in a children’s museum or in a developmen-
tal psychology laboratory. First, the experimenter
said that they would ask children questions and
that there were no right or wrong answers. Further-
more, the experimenter specified that they would
read sentences about other people and that children
would indicate their agreement with each sentence.
The experimenter then introduced children to a
five-point scale consisting of stick figures arrayed
from smallest to largest on a sheet of paper and
instructed children on how to use the scale (e.g.,
asking them to point to the smallest picture if they
didn’t agree at all with a sentence the experimenter
said). The remaining labels were “agree a little bit,”
“agree a medium amount,” “agree a lot,” and
“agree completely.” The experimenter then asked
children two test items to gauge their understand-
ing of the scale (“Can you show me where you
would point if you didn’t agree with the answer at
all?”; “Can you show me where you would point if
you agree a medium amount?”). On average, chil-
dren used the scale correctly: 99% correctly
answered the item asking where they would point
if they “don’t agree with the answer at all” and
90% correctly answered the item asking where they
would point if they “agree a medium amount.”
Participants who answered incorrectly received cor-
rective feedback and, subsequently, received a sec-
ond chance to respond to the item. All participants
who did not answer correctly initially provided the
correct answer on their second try. See Supporting
Information for relevant study materials associated
with this article, including the scale used to elicit
children’s responses.
Following these instructions, the experimenter
showed children pictures of stick figures on a
Power Point display. Here and in Study 2, we
referred to each individual using male pronouns
because most people incarcerated in the United
States are male (Bronson & Carson, 2019). The
experimenter then pointed to each individual, one
at a time, and described him as having either good
or bad moral character. For example, the experi-
menter described the “nice” (morally good) individ-
ual as liking to “help others” and the “mean”
(morally bad) individual as liking to “start fights
with other people.” In addition to learning about
one “nice” and one “mean” individual, participants
learned about a “religious” individual and an
“atheistic” individual. Including the latter two indi-
viduals in this study allowed us to investigate how
participants’ views of religious qualities compared
to their views of moral qualities. This question did
not directly concern the main research question;
therefore, participants’ views of religious qualities
will not be discussed further in the Main Text (see
Supporting Information for relevant experimental
items and analyses).
After providing information about an individ-
ual’s moral character, the experimenter told partici-
pants that the individual had broken the law and
gone to jail (punishment condition) or that the indi-
vidual had gone on a business trip (control condi-
tion); that is, condition type was a between-
participants variable. We chose a business trip as
the control condition because, like incarceration
(Travis, 2005), work-related absences can be lengthy
but are typically temporary. To aid comprehension,
children in the punishment condition saw a series
of Power Point animations depicting the punished
individual entering and subsequently being carried
away from his home by a police car. After watching
the series of animations, children viewed an image
of the punished individual standing in a jail cell.
Children in the control condition saw a series of
Power Point animations depicting the control indi-
vidual entering and subsequently being carried
away from his home by an airplane. After watching
these animations, children viewed an image of the
control individual standing in a business office.
The remainder of Study 1 progressed in two
parts. During Part I, the experimenter asked partici-
pants in the punishment condition to rate their
agreement with four statements regarding each
punished individual’s moral character (e.g., “How
much do you agree that now, Frank is a good per-
son deep, deep down inside?”). Each of the four
items highlighted positively valenced characteris-
tics: one item focused on individuals’ good
“essences,” one item focused on individuals’ kind
behaviors, and two items focused on individuals’
prosocial intentions (see Supporting Information for
all experimental items). We framed items in terms
of individuals’ positively, instead of negatively,
valenced characteristics because we did not want to
introduce or reinforce any negative preconceptions
about individuals who have come into contact with
the criminal legal system.
The experimenter pointed at the individual
standing in the jail cell while asking each item. The
experimenter began Part II by saying, “Frank stays
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in jail for a really, really long time. Eventually,
Frank finishes all the time that he needed to spend
in jail, and he is allowed to go back home.” To
ensure that children understood that the punished
individuals left jail, the experimenter then showed
children corresponding images of each individual
standing near his home. After providing this infor-
mation, the experimenter once again asked partici-
pants to rate their agreement with the same four
statements regarding each individual’s moral char-
acter (e.g., “How much do you agree that now,
Frank is a good person deep, deep down inside?”).
The purpose of asking the same set of experimental
items in Parts I and II was to examine the extent to
which participants believe that moral character
changes as a function of punishment. Critically,
measuring perceived moral character at baseline
(i.e., at the beginning of individuals’ punishment)
and following the punishment allowed us to tabu-
late the extent to which participants perceived pun-
ishment as eliciting moral improvement, moral
decline, or no change in moral character.
The procedure of the control condition closely
mirrored that of the punishment condition. Here,
participants rated their agreement with four state-
ments regarding each individual’s moral character at
the beginning (Part I) and conclusion (Part II) of the
business trip. As in the punishment condition, we
employed visual aids to ensure children understood
that the individuals in the control vignettes had
returned from their business trips. Specifically, the
experimenter showed children corresponding images
of each control individual standing near his home.
Adults completed this procedure online and
selected the scale label that best matched their
response (i.e., they viewed only the verbal labels,
not the stick figures used to represent the scale to
children). Moreover, adults did not view the visual
stimuli used to aid children’s comprehension of the
story; instead, they only read descriptions of each
scenario. We made these changes because adults
are better able than children to attend to verbal
information and do not require pictures to draw
their attention to stimuli.
Both children and adults answered all items
about each individual before moving on to the next
individual. For example, after answering all items
about the “mean” individual, participants com-
pleted the same procedure for the “nice” individ-
ual. The order in which participants learned about
each individual was counterbalanced across partici-
pants, as was the order of experimental items
regarding each individual. Based on recommenda-
tions to include approximately 50 participants per
cell in psychological research (Lakens & Evers,
2014; Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2013), we
aimed to recruit approximately 50 participants in
each condition (punishment condition: nchildren = 48;
nadults = 49; control condition: nchildren = 46;
nadults = 45). The number of participants per cell is
comparable to prior work in developmental psy-
chology (Heiphetz, 2019; Heiphetz, Lane, Waytz, &
Young, 2018; Rhodes, Leslie, Saunders, Dunham, &
Cimpian, 2018; Shaw & Olson, 2015).
Results
Here and in Study 2, we adjusted analyses that
included multiple comparisons using a Bonferroni
correction. Additionally, we conducted sensitivity
power analyses in G*Power (power = 80%, α = .05;
Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) to ensure
that the current sample sizes provided enough
power to detect reliable effects. Unless otherwise
noted, all significant pairwise comparisons yielded
p values below the Bonferroni-corrected significance
threshold and effect sizes that were above the sensi-
tivity analysis-generated threshold. See Supporting
Information for additional information regarding
the adjusted alpha level and sensitivity analysis
generated threshold for each set of pairwise com-
parisons. In addition to the main analyses reported
below, we investigated whether participant age pre-
dicted responses in our data. This variable did not
reliably predict participants’ responses. See Sup-
porting Information for these analyses and descrip-
tive statistics for each item in each of the studies.
We averaged participants’ responses to the four
items regarding each individual’s moral character
at the beginning of his incarceration/trip to create a
composite score (“nice” individuals: α = .81;
“mean” individuals: α = .89). We did the same for
the four items regarding each individual’s moral
character after the incarceration/trip (“nice” individ-
uals: α = .84; “mean” individuals: α = .95). For ease
of interpretation, the main dependent variable was
the difference between these two composite values,
indicating perceived moral change. In addition to
conducting analyses using a difference score, we
analyzed our data using raw means, and our inter-
pretation of the results is consistent across analytic
approaches. See Supporting Information for these
analyses and the associated descriptive statistics.
Evaluations of “Nice” Individuals
We investigated participants’ responses using
two types of analyses (Figure 1). First, we examined
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the extent to which participants reported that
“nice” individuals changed after punishment and
after going on a business trip. We used a series of
one-sample t-tests to compare perceived change
scores to 0 (indicating, on average, no perceived
moral change) in each condition among children
and, separately, adults. Children did not report that
“nice” individuals changed as a function of punish-
ment (t(47) = 1.72, p = .092, Cohen’s d = 0.25, 95%
CIdiff: [−0.03, 0.37]) or of going on a business trip (t
(45) = −1.84, p = .072, Cohen’s d = −0.27, 95%
CIdiff: [−0.30, 0.01]). Like children, adults did not
report that “nice” individuals changed as a result of
going on a business trip (t(44) = 0.71, p = .479,
Cohen’s d = 0.11, 95% CIdiff: [−0.06, 0.13]). How-
ever, unlike children, adults reported that “nice”
individuals became less “nice” after punishment (t
(47) = −3.21, p = .002, Cohen’s d = −0.46, 95%
CIdiff: [−0.43, −0.10]).
Next, we conducted a 2 (Participant Age: child
vs. adult) × 2 (Condition: punishment vs. control)
between-participants analysis of variance (ANOVA)
in order to investigate whether children and adults
reported different magnitudes of change in each
condition. This analysis revealed a Participant
Age × Condition interaction (F(1, 183) = 14.70,
p < .001, η2p = .07). Neither of the main effects
reached significance (ps ≥ .101). To examine the
Participant Age × Condition interaction, we con-
ducted two sets of tests. First, we compared the
magnitude of change children expected in the pun-
ishment condition with the magnitude of change
children expected in the business trip condition,
and we conducted an analogous comparison among
adults. Both children and adults distinguished
between the punishment and the business trip con-
ditions. However, they did so in different ways.
Children reported that “nice” individuals became “
nicer” after receiving punishment than after going
on a business trip (p = .006, Cohen’s d = 0.51, 95%
CIdiff: [0.09, 0.54]). However, this effect size was
smaller than the smallest effect size that could be
detected given the present samples; thus, caution is
warranted in interpreting this result. In contrast,
adults reported that “nice” individuals became
less “nice” after receiving punishment than after
going on a business trip (p = .009, Cohen’s d = 0.64,
95% CIdiff: [−0.52, −0.08]).
Second, we investigated whether children and
adults reported different magnitudes of change in
the punishment versus business trip condition.
Children reported stronger increases in moral good-
ness after punishment than did adults (p < .001,
Cohen’s d = 0.69, 95% CIdiff: [0.22, 0.66]). A signifi-
cant difference in perceived change did not emerge
between children and adults in the business trip
condition (p = .129, Cohen’s d = 0.41, 95% CIdiff:
[−0.40, 0.05]).
Evaluations of “Mean” Individuals
Once again, we investigated participants’
responses using two types of analyses (Figure 1).
First, we examined the extent to which participants
perceived “mean” individuals to change after





















“Nice” Individual “Mean” Individual
Children Adults Children Adults
Figure 1. Average perceived change in moral goodness, Study 1. Positive values reflect perceived increases in moral goodness, whereas
negative values reflect perceived decreases in moral goodness. Zero indicates no perceived change in moral goodness. Error bars repre-
sent 95% CIs.
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on a business trip. As above, we used a series of
one-sample t-tests to compare perceived change
scores to 0 in both conditions among children and,
separately, adults. Children reported that “mean”
individuals became “nicer” after receiving punish-
ment (t(46) = 7.21, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.05, 95%
CIdiff: [0.78, 1.39]) and after going on a business trip
(t(45) = 2.91, p = .006, Cohen’s d = 0.43, 95% CIdiff:
[0.11, 0.63]). However, these effects did not emerge
among adults (punishment: (t(47) = 0.51, p = .612,
Cohen’s d = 0.07, 95% CIdiff: [−0.11, 0.18]); business
trip: (t(42) = 1.02, p = .315, Cohen’s d = 0.16, 95%
CIdiff: [−0.06, 0.19]).
Next, we conducted a 2 (Participant Age: child
vs. adult) × 2 (Condition: punishment vs. control)
between-participants ANOVA in order to investi-
gate whether children and adults reported different
magnitudes of change in each condition. This analy-
sis revealed main effects of Participant Age (F(1,
180) = 37.43, p < .001, η2p = .17) and Condition (F(1,
180) = 9.66, p = .002, η2p = .05). These main effects
were qualified by a Participant Age × Condition
interaction (F(1, 180) = 11.27, p = .001, η2p = .06). To
further examine this interaction, we conducted two
sets of tests. First, we compared the magnitude of
change children expected in the punishment condi-
tion with the magnitude of change children
expected in the business trip condition, and we con-
ducted an analogous analysis among adults. Chil-
dren expected stronger increases in moral goodness
after punishment than after a business trip
(p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.75, 95% CIdiff: [0.41, 1.02]).
This pattern did not emerge among adults
(p = .862, Cohen’s d = 0.06, 95% CIdiff: [−0.34,
0.28]). Second, we investigated whether children
and adults reported different magnitudes of change
in each condition. Children reported stronger
increases in moral goodness after punishment than
did adults (p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.30, 95% CIdiff:
[0.75, 1.35]). No significant difference in perceived
change emerged between children and adults in the
business trip condition (p = .056, Cohen’s d = 0.45,
95% CIdiff: [−0.01, 0.62]).
Discussion
The purpose of Study 1 was to examine chil-
dren’s and adults’ judgments about how “nice”
and, separately, “mean” individuals’ moral attri-
butes might change as a result of being punished
(i.e., going to jail). Three main results emerged.
First, children, unlike adults, reported that “mean”
individuals became “nicer” after punishment. Sec-
ond, children reported that punishment catalyzed a
greater increase in “mean” individuals’ moral good-
ness than did going on a business trip. Third,
whereas adults expected “nice” individuals to
become less “nice” following punishment, we did
not observe this effect among children. These find-
ings extend past work suggesting that children are
more optimistic about others than are adults (e.g.,
Boseovski, 2010) by demonstrating that children are
even optimistic about those whom many people
perceive to have committed severe moral transgres-
sions (e.g., people who broke the law). Crucially,
this work moves beyond past research demonstrat-
ing that children believe negative characteristics
change for the better over time (e.g., Lockhart et al.,
2008) by showing that children reported more
moral growth in “mean” individuals after punish-
ment than after going on a business trip. In other
words, the present work suggests that children may
view severe punishment (incarceration) as a potent
driver of moral improvement.
Study 2
Study 2 built on Study 1 in several ways. The pri-
mary contribution of Study 2 was to investigate
whether the main pattern of results from Study 1
would generalize to different types of punishment.
Based on the results from Study 1, it remains
unclear whether children view only extremely sev-
ere punishments (e.g., incarceration) as a vehicle for
positive moral change, or whether this effect gener-
alizes to less severe punishments. On the one hand,
children sometimes engage in proportional reason-
ing. For example, they report that people who are
more causally responsible for a crime deserve more
punishment than those who are less causally
responsible (Finkel, Liss, & Moran, 1997). Conse-
quently, children may assume proportionality when
judging the link between punishment severity and
perceived moral change; namely, they may judge
that relatively severe punishments elicit moral
improvement more effectively than do relatively
mild punishments. On the other hand, children’s
judgments sometimes strongly depend on the pres-
ence of particular factors, even if those factors are
only present in small amounts. For instance, chil-
dren in elementary school sometimes categorize
Black-White multiracial individuals as Black despite
the presence of both Black and White ancestors
(e.g., Roberts & Gelman, 2017). Similarly, elemen-
tary school-aged children may judge redemption on
the basis of only small amounts of punishment, rea-
soning that relatively mild punishment can still
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result in moral improvement. To test between these
possibilities, Study 2 compared perceived moral
improvement after a relatively minor punishment
(time-out) versus a relatively severe punishment
(incarceration).
Probing views of moral character following sev-
ere versus relatively minor punishment also has
implications for theories of jurisprudence. Some
punishment theorists, at least implicitly, assume
that punishment must be severe in order to be com-
municative (Feinberg, 1965; Hart, 1959; Murphy &
Hampton, 1988). However, whether or not this is
actually the case is an empirical question. By exam-
ining what severe and relatively minor punish-
ments signal about a person’s moral character, the
present work empirically tested an assumption
made by some punishment theorists.
In addition to testing generalizability, Study 2
also made several secondary contributions. First,
Study 2 allowed us to determine the extent to which
the pattern of results from Study 1 would replicate
in a new sample of children. Second, Study 2 chan-
ged the point at which we collected the “baseline”
measure of individuals’ moral character. In Study 1,
we asked participants about individuals’ moral
character at the beginning of their incarceration and,
separately, when they returned home. In Study 2,
we asked participants about individuals’ moral
character before receiving punishment and, sepa-
rately, when they returned home. Changing the
“baseline” about which we asked allowed us to
more precisely capture the degree of perceived
change following each type of punishment. Third,
Study 2 included a more nuanced measure to cap-
ture participants’ responses. Data for Study 2 were
collected between Summer and Fall 2018.
Method
Participants
Recruitment procedures were identical to Study
1, with two main exceptions. First, we only
recruited children in Study 2. We made this deci-
sion because only children reported that “mean”
people changed in accordance with punishment in
Study 1, and we wanted to further probe the poten-
tial limits of this effect in Study 2. Second, we
recruited children for Study 2 from a departmental
database and at a partnering developmental psy-
chology laboratory in a large city in the northeast-
ern United States.
Our final sample included 77 children between 6
and 8 years old (Mage = 6.92 years, SDage =
0.85 years; 60% female, 40% male). Parents identi-
fied their children as White or European-American
(25%), Black or African American (17%), Asian or
Asian American (16%), Native American or Pacific
Islander (4%), Multiracial (23%), and Other (8%);
the remaining parents did not indicate their chil-
dren’s racial group membership. Additionally, 23%
of parents identified their children as Hispanic or
Latinx. Data from three additional participants were
excluded because the child did not speak English
(n = 1), the child had a reported developmental dis-
ability (n = 1), or the parent interfered during test-
ing (n = 1). Nine parents reported that their child
knew at least one person who has experienced
incarceration. However, no significant differences in
responses to the main dependent variables emerged
between participants who knew at least one incar-
cerated individual and those who did not (see Sup-
porting Information for relevant exploratory
analyses). Moreover, we also conducted a series of
exploratory analysis examining the extent to which
participant race and ethnicity predicted participant
responses. As in Study 1, neither of these variables
reliably predicted participants’ responses (see Sup-
porting Information for relevant analyses).
Procedure
First, the interviewer said that they would ask
children questions and that there were no right or
wrong answers. The interviewer further specified
that they would show the child pictures of people
on a computer screen, tell the child information
about the people, and subsequently ask questions
about the people. The remainder of the study pro-
ceeded in four main parts, which we describe
below. The entire procedure is also illustrated in
Figure 2.
During Part I, the experimenter displayed an
image of a pair of individuals on a laptop computer
screen and described the pair as being either “nice”
or “mean” (e.g., “Here are two people—Frank and
Bobby. Frank and Bobby like to start fights with
other people. They are both very mean”). These
descriptions closely matched those used in Study 1.
After describing the pair of individuals, the experi-
menter asked participants four items about each
individual’s moral character. The content of the
moral character items in Study 2 was identical to
those used in Study 1 (as in Study 1, each of the
four items highlighted positively valenced charac-
teristics); however, the method of eliciting
responses differed across the two studies. Instead of
eliciting participants’ responses using a five-point
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scale as in Study 1, participants in Study 2
responded to yes-or-no items (e.g., “Do you agree
that Frank is a good person deep, deep down
inside? Yes, or no?”). The experimenter followed up
each item with a more fine-grained item (“How
sure are you? Are you very sure, kind of sure, or
not very sure?”). We assigned responses numerical
values from −3 (indicating least optimism about
individual’s moral character, e.g., very sure that the
individual was not morally good) to + 3 (indicating
most optimism about individual’s moral character,
e.g., very sure that the individual was morally
good). We adapted this two-step approach from
prior research in developmental psychology (e.g.,
Bregant et al., 2016; Hussak & Cimpian, 2018).
Implementing this approach allowed us to capture
more nuanced responses from participants in a way
young children could understand. Participants
answered items about one individual in the pair
before moving on to items about the other individ-
ual in the pair.
After answering items about both individuals,
participants proceeded to Part II. Here, they learned
that each individual in the pair—regardless of
whether the pair was described as “nice” or
“mean”—broke the law. The experimenter specified
that each individual committed the same
transgression (e.g., “One day, Frank and Bobby both
broke the law. They did the exact same thing”).
The purpose of providing this instruction was to
ensure that participants did not infer that individu-
als experienced different punishments because they
committed different transgressions. Next, partici-
pants learned that each individual received punish-
ment. Unlike in Study 1, where individuals were
punished by going to jail, individuals in Study 2
were punished in one of two ways. One individual
in each pair was described as receiving a relatively
severe punishment (going to jail) whereas the other
individual was described as receiving a relatively
minor punishment (going to time-out). To ensure
that children understood that going to jail was rela-
tively more severe than going to time-out, the
experimenter provided detailed descriptions of both
the jail and the “time-out house.” For example, par-
ticipants learned that individuals who went to jail
could never choose what they did, but that individ-
uals who went to time-out could sometimes choose
what they did. Additionally, children viewed pic-
tures of each punishment environment as it was
described to help them differentiate between the
two types of punishment. When learning about
individuals who were incarcerated, participants
viewed pictures of stick figures standing in a jail
Part I: Pair #1
Baseline measure of 
moral character; e.g., 
“Do you agree that 
Frank is a good person 
deep, deep down 
inside? Yes, or no?”
Part II continued: Pair 
#1
Punishment severity 
questions; e.g., “Do you 
agree that going to jail 
is a big punishment for 
Frank? Yes, or no?”
Part II: Pair #1
Individuals break law; 
one individual goes to 
jail, the other individual 
goes to time-out
Part III: Pair #1
Punishment avoidance 
questions; e.g., “Do you 
agree that Frank does 
not want to live in the 
jail again? Yes, or no?”
Part IV: Pair #1
Post-punishment 
measure moral 
character; e.g., “Do you 
agree that Frank is a 
good person deep, deep 
down inside? Yes, or 
no?” 
Repeat Parts I-IV for 
each individual in Pair 
#2
Figure 2. A schematic representation of Study 2’s procedure. As noted in Study 2’s procedure, participants finished responded to items
in each block before moving on to the next block; all participants responded to items in each block in the order depicted above.
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cell. When learning about individuals who went to
time-out, participants viewed pictures of stick fig-
ures standing in a room without jail bars (see Sup-
porting Information for an example).
After describing the punishment each individual
received, the experimenter asked children the first
of two test items to gauge their understanding of
the story (e.g., “Can you remind me, where was
Frank taken? Was he taken to jail, or was he taken
to the time-out house?”). Each of the test items
focused on one individual in the pair. Following
the first test item, participants answered four yes-
or-no items probing their views of how severely the
individual in that item was punished (e.g., “Do you
agree that going to jail is a big punishment for
Frank? Yes, or no?”). The experimenter followed up
each item with a more fine-grained item (“How
sure are you? Are you very sure, kind of sure, or
not very sure?”). We assigned responses numerical
values from −3 (indicating the least severity, e.g.,
very sure that the punishment is not severe) to + 3
(indicating most severity, e.g., very sure that the
punishment is severe).
During Part III, participants rated the extent to
which the individual highlighted in the first test
item wanted to avoid a similar punishment in the
future. In doing so, participants answered four yes-
or-no items (e.g., “Do you agree that Frank does
not want to live in the jail again? Yes, or no?”). The
experimenter followed up each item with addi-
tional, more fine-grained items (“How sure are
you? Are you very sure, kind of sure, or not very
sure?”). We assigned responses assigned numerical
values from −3 (indicating least desire to avoid
punishment, e.g., very sure that the individual does
not want to avoid punishment in the future) to + 3
(indicating most desire to avoid punishment, e.g.,
very sure that the individual wants to avoid punish-
ment in the future). The purpose of asking these
items was to test whether the desire to avoid future
punishment could explain the relation between
punishment type and the degree to which individu-
als are perceived to change as a result of punish-
ment. However, these items did not become a
central component of our analyses because we did
not find a significant difference in children’s
responses to items probing moral change following
jail compared to those probing moral change fol-
lowing time-out (see Results section below for addi-
tional details). Given this non-significant difference,
we do not discuss the mediation analyses further.
During Part IV, the experimenter told partici-
pants that the individual discussed in the first test
item finished serving time in either the jail or the
“time-out house” and returned home. Participants
then answered four yes-or-no items about the pun-
ished individual’s positive moral characteristics;
these items were identical to the items asked about
the same individual in Part I. The purpose of hav-
ing a “baseline” measure of moral character (i.e.,
before individuals were punished) and a post-pun-
ishment measure of moral character was to examine
the extent to which participants viewed punishment
as a vehicle for moral change. As in Study 1, mea-
suring perceived moral character at baseline (i.e.,
before individuals’ punishment) and following the
punishment allowed us to tabulate the extent to
which participants perceived punishment as elicit-
ing moral improvement, moral decline, or no
change in moral character.
After recording children’s responses to items in
Parts I-IV, the experimenter said, “Okay, so now I
am going to tell you the rest of the story about
[name of the second individual in the first pair].”
Following these instructions, the experimenter
asked children an additional test item about how
the second individual in the pair was punished
(e.g., “Can you remind me, where was Bobby
taken? Was he taken to jail, or was he taken to the
time-out house?”). If children provided an incorrect
response, the experimenter reminded participants of
the correct answer. Next, the experimenter
reminded participants about the details of the sec-
ond individual’s punishment (e.g., “So remember,
when he was in the ‘time-out house,’ people some-
times told Bobby what to do”). The experimenter
then asked participants items analogous to those
asked about the first individual in Part II (four
items about how severely the second individual was
punished), Part III (four items about how much the
second individual wanted to avoid a similar punish-
ment in the future), and Part IV (four items about
the second individual’s moral character after punish-
ment). After answering all items about the first pair
of individuals (in the example above, the “mean”
pair), participants completed the same procedure
for the second pair of individuals (in this case, the
“nice” pair).
The following items were counterbalanced across
participants in Study 2: (1) the order in which indi-
viduals within a pair were introduced, (2) the order
in which participants learned about the “nice” and
“mean” pairs of individuals, (3) the order of experi-
mental items (e.g., items about whether an individ-
ual is morally good), (4) the placement of
individuals within each trial (e.g., the individual
who went to jail was sometimes on the left side of
the screen and sometimes on the right side).
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Results
Perceived Severity of Time-Out Versus Jail
To determine whether our manipulation of
punishment severity was effective, we first com-
pared children’s views of the severity of going to
jail versus time-out. After determining that each
set of items probing the perceived severity of
going to jail (αnice = .68, αmean = .74) and time-out
(αnice = .79, αmean = .71) had acceptable reliability,
we collapsed items in each condition into separate
variables; see Supporting Information for descrip-
tive statistics for each set of items in Study 2.
Subsequently, we used a series of paired-samples
t-tests to compare punishment severity scores in
each condition. The manipulation of perceived
severity across punishment types worked as
intended: children viewed jail as a more severe
punishment than time-out in both conditions
(“nice” condition: t(73) = 16.43, p < .001, Cohen’s
d = 1.91, 95% CIdiff: [3.26, 4.16]; “mean” condition:
t(74) = 19.19, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 2.22, 95%
CIdiff: [3.29, 4.05]).
Evaluations of “Nice” Individuals
We investigated participants’ responses using
two types of analyses (Figure 3). First, we exam-
ined the extent to which participants reported that
“nice” individuals changed after each type of pun-
ishment. Items probing views of moral goodness at
each time point had acceptable reliability in both
conditions (jail: αbefore = .69, αafter = .86; time-out:
αbefore = .86, αafter = .76). Thus, we collapsed across
items for each time point. As in Study 1, the main
dependent variable was the difference in perceived
moral character before and after punishment. Sub-
sequently, we used a series of one-sample t-tests to
compare perceived change scores to 0 in both con-
ditions. Children did not report that “nice” individ-
uals’ characteristics changed after experiencing
either form of punishment (going to jail: t
(73) = −1.70, p = .093, Cohen’s d = −0.20, 95%
CIdiff: [−0.41, 0.03]; time-out: t(73) = −2.23,
p = .029, Cohen’s d = −0.26, 95% CIdiff: [−0.54,
−0.03]; note that the effect for the time-out condi-
tion drops to non-significance after applying a Bon-
ferroni correction). Next, we conducted a paired-
samples t-tests to compare perceived change scores
in the jail and time-out conditions. No significant
difference in perceived change emerged (t
(73) = 0.87, p = .388, Cohen’s d = 0.10, 95% CIdiff:
[−0.12, 0.32]).
Evaluations of “Mean” Individuals
Once again, we investigated participants’
responses using two types of analyses (Figure 3).
First, we examined the extent to which participants
reported that “mean” individuals became “nicer”
after each type of punishment. After determining
that items probing views of moral character at each
time point had acceptable reliability in both condi-
tions (jail: αbefore = .66; αafter = .87; time-out: αbe-
fore = .79; αafter = .86), we collapsed across items for
each time point. Again, the main dependent vari-
able was the difference in perceived moral character
before and after punishment. First, we used a series
of one-sample t-tests to compare perceived change
scores to 0 in both conditions. Children reported
that “mean” individuals became significantly
“nicer” after going to jail (t(74) = 14.15, p < .001,
Cohen’s d = 1.63, 95% CIdiff: [2.80, 3.72]) and, sepa-
rately, after going to time-out (t(74) = 12.71,
p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.47, 95% CIdiff: [2.58, 3.54]).
Next, we conducted a paired-samples t-tests to
compare perceived change scores in the jail and
time-out conditions. A significant difference did not
emerge (t(74) = 1.03, p = .305, Cohen’s d = 0.12,
95% CIdiff: [−0.18, 0.60]).
Discussion
Study 2 conceptually replicated and extended the
results from Study 1 among a new sample of chil-
dren. As in Study 1, children in Study 2 reported
that “mean” individuals become “nicer” after pun-
ishment. Also as in Study 1, we did not observe
that children in Study 2 reported that “nice” indi-
viduals would change as a result of punishment. In
other words, children in Study 2 appeared to view
punishment as a vehicle for positive moral change.
Additionally, Study 2 examined whether the effects
from Study 1 depend on the severity of punish-
ment. Although children in Study 2 reported that
going to jail was a more severe punishment than
going to time-out, they expected “mean” individu-
als to become “nicer” regardless of whether they
went to time-out or jail. Importantly, the degree of
reported moral improvement did not significantly
differ across punishment contexts. Of course, null
effects are difficult to interpret; it is possible that
the degree of reported moral improvement differs
across punishment contexts, and the current work
failed to capture this difference. Thus, caution is
warranted in interpreting this result. Nevertheless,
these findings suggest that children may view
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multiple forms of punishment as a signal of
redemption.
General Discussion
This work examined children’s and adults’ views
about the impact of punishment on moral character.
In Study 1, elementary schoolers and adults
reported on the extent to which one especially sev-
ere form of punishment (incarceration) impacted
“nice” and, separately, “mean” individuals’ moral
character. Children, but not adults, reported that
“mean” individuals became “nicer” following sev-
ere punishment. Moreover, we did not find evi-
dence that children viewed “nice” individuals as
changing following severe punishment. Adults,
unlike children, reported that “nice” individuals
became less “nice” following severe punishment.
These findings suggest that children, but not adults,
may view at least one type of severe punishment as
a vehicle for positive moral change.
Study 2 built on these results by investigating
the extent to which children’s beliefs about the
impact of punishment on moral character depend
on punishment severity. Here, children reported on
the extent to which “nice” and, separately, “mean”
individuals’ moral character changed following a
relatively minor punishment (time-out) and, sepa-
rately, a relatively severe punishment (incarcera-
tion). Despite acknowledging that incarceration is a
more severe type of punishment than time-out, chil-
dren reported that “mean” individuals became
“nicer” regardless of punishment type. Importantly,
the degree of reported moral improvement among
“mean” individuals did not significantly differ
across punishment types, suggesting that children
may conceptualize punishment—regardless of how
severe—as a signal of moral redemption.
The present findings make theoretical contribu-
tions to several bodies of scholarship. First, the cur-
rent work expands the scientific understanding of
social cognitive development. Past work led to two
competing possibilities regarding how views about
the impact of punishment on moral character might
differ among children and adults. On the one hand,
elementary schoolers are typically more likely than
adults to view the social world through an essen-
tialist lens (e.g., Chalik et al., 2017; Heiphetz et al.,
2017; Hussak & Cimpian, 2019; Taylor et al., 2009),
including when reasoning about moral character
(Heiphetz, 2019, 2020). In other words, elementary
schoolers are typically more likely than adults to
view human characteristics—including moral char-
acter—as unchangeable, innate, and rooted in biol-
ogy. Thus, elementary schoolers could be less likely
than adults to report that punishment changes
moral character. On the other hand, elementary
schoolers typically express more optimism than
adults (e.g., Boseovski, 2010). Thus, compared to
adults, elementary schoolers could be more opti-
mistic that punishment may improve moral charac-
ter. The results of Study 1 were consistent with the
second possibility, showing that elementary school-
ers—but not adults—viewed one especially severe
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Figure 3. Average perceived change in moral goodness, Study 2. Positive values reflect perceived increases in moral goodness, whereas
negative values reflect perceived decreases in moral goodness. Zero indicates no perceived change in moral goodness. Error bars repre-
sent 95% CIs.
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“mean” individuals become “nicer.” This finding
jointly contributes to theories regarding the devel-
opment of essentialism as well as optimism by
showing that children’s positivity may overpower
their tendency to apply an essentialist framework
to moral character.
Second, the present work adds to theoretical
models of punishment by demonstrating that peo-
ple expect punishment to change others’ moral
characteristics. In both Studies 1 and 2, children
reported that “mean” individuals became “nicer”
following punishment. Moreover, adults in Study 1
reported that “nice” individuals’ positive moral
characteristics worsened following punishment.
These findings are noteworthy in light of past work
investigating the link between perceived moral
character and punishment. Namely, past work has
shown that perceived immoral character increases
punitive outcomes even when behavior is held con-
stant (e.g., Nadler & McDonnell, 2011). The current
work extends this research by showing that punish-
ment also impacts perceptions of punished individ-
uals’ moral character. In other words, the current
work demonstrates the reverse directional link by
showing that punishment impacts perceived moral
character.
Third, the current work contributes to work in
experimental jurisprudence. Many legal theorists
discuss the expressive nature of punishment (e.g.,
Feinberg, 1965; Kahan, 1996; Murphy & Hampton,
1988). However, relatively less research has empiri-
cally examined how laypeople interpret the mes-
sage communicated via punishment. The current
work addressed this topic and found that children,
but not adults, may interpret punishment as
expressing a social message that “mean” individu-
als have changed for the better. Put slightly differ-
ently, the present work suggests that children may
conceptualize punishment as a vehicle for moral
redemption; however, over development, the con-
ceptualization of "punishment-as-redemption"
declines. In addition to elucidating how people
interpret punishment’s messages, the present work
examined the assumption made by some expressive
punishment theorists that punishment needs to be
severe in order to be communicative (Feinberg,
1965; Hart, 1959; Murphy & Hampton, 1988). The
results of Study 2 suggest that there may be nuance
to this view. While it is possible that only messages
emitted by severe punishments are audible to
adults, the current work suggests that, among chil-
dren, punishment need not be severe in order be
communicative. Here, children reported that both
severe (incarceration) and relatively minor (time-
out) punishments help “mean” individuals become
“nicer.” Thus, at least among children, punishment
does not need to be severe in order to be commu-
nicative.
Limitations and Directions for Future Research
The present work provides critical insight into
how laypeople conceptualize the impact of punish-
ment on moral character. In doing so, the current
research clarifies an understudied topic within psy-
chology (incarceration) and leverages experimental
methods to answer questions that have traditionally
been the purview of legal scholars and philosophers
(e.g., what punishment communicates). Neverthe-
less, the present work is limited in some ways, and
several additional questions remain ripe for future
investigation.
One limitation of the current work is that it did
not focus on why children and adults reported dif-
ferent views of the impact of severe punishment on
moral character. Thus, a fruitful direction for future
research concerns identifying potential mechanisms
underlying this pattern of results. One possibility—
the optimism account—posits that domain-general
age-related changes in social cognition may under-
lie differences in children’s and adults’ responses.
As discussed in the Introduction, elementary
schoolers—the age range tested in the current
research—are typically more optimistic than adults
(e.g., Boseovski, 2010). Importantly, past research
has documented age-related declines in optimism
regarding different types of characteristics (moral
and non-moral) in several domains. For instance,
children are more likely than adults to endorse the
idea that people’s physical appearance, intellectual
ability, and moral characteristics will improve sub-
stantially over time (e.g., predicting that people will
become better looking, smarter, and nicer with
time, Heyman & Giles, 2004; Lockhart et al., 2008).
Thus, domain-general age-related decreases in opti-
mism may help explain why children—but not
adults—reported that “mean” individuals became
“nicer” after incarceration and, separately, why
only adults expected “nice” individuals’ moral
character to worsen following punishment.
Alternatively, the social input account posits that
cultural messages shape conceptual representations
of carceral facilities over development, which, in
turn, may alter views about the impact of incarcera-
tion on moral character. Prior work argues that
people living in the United States primarily “form
their impressions of crime and the criminal legal
system based on what they hear, read, and see in
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the media” (Yousman, 2009, p. 1). Importantly, peo-
ple living in the United States typically consume
media that portray prisons and jails as dangerous,
torturous, and rife with violence (Bennett, 2006;
Yousman, 2009). Given that social input shapes con-
ceptual development (e.g., Chalik et al., 2017; Gel-
man, 2009), such messages could influence people’s
views about the impact of incarceration on moral
character across age. Specifically, as children grow
into adults, they may come to view carceral envi-
ronments as less rehabilitative because of the nega-
tive messages they hear about incarceration (e.g.,
through the media). Thus, adults in the current
work may have reported pessimism about the
impact of incarceration on moral character because
over time they have consumed—and subsequently
accepted—media messages portraying carceral facil-
ities as inhospitable to moral improvement.
Future work can test between these two candi-
date mechanisms by modifying the procedure to
Study 2 to include both children and adults in the
same experimental paradigm. As previously men-
tioned, some evidence suggests that age-related
declines in optimism are domain-general (e.g.,
Boseovski, 2010); thus, adults’ relative pessimism
about incarceration may also generalize to other
types of punishment. Consistent with the optimism
account, adults may be less likely than children to
report that either incarceration or time-out
improves moral character. However, consistent with
the social input account, adults’ negativity may be
specific to incarceration (given that media transmit
far more negative messages about incarceration
than time-out). If this is the case, (1) adults may
report more pessimism about the impact of incar-
ceration on moral character than children, and (2)
children and adults may report similarly optimistic
views about the impact of time-out on moral char-
acter.
Another way to test between the two aforemen-
tioned potential mechanisms includes employing
cross-cultural methods. Some legal scholars have
described criminal punishment in Europe as having
a different “flavor” than criminal punishment in the
United States. Unlike in the United States, criminal
punishment in Europe “embraces ideals of rehabili-
tation and forgiveness” (Kleinfeld, 2016, p. 1035).
Individuals growing up in Europe may attend to
such cultural messages linking punishment with
rehabilitation and positive change. In turn, Euro-
pean adults may view punishment as indicative of
moral redemption. Thus, there may be greater
developmental stability in reasoning about the
impact of punishment on moral character in Europe
than in the United States. Such a result would sug-
gest that social input (e.g., media, cultural mes-
sages) shapes people’s concepts about what it is
like to spend time in a carceral facility and, thus,
provide evidence in favor of the social input account.
In addition to testing between the optimism and
social input accounts, future work can examine
which aspects of United States carceral facilities
underlie adults’ pessimism. For example, the sever-
ity associated with incarceration may drive adults’
pessimism regarding this specific type of punish-
ment. When addressing this topic, it may be partic-
ularly useful to manipulate severity in punitive
contexts other than incarceration. Doing so may be
particularly helpful considering that several factors
could potentially influence participants’ responses
to items about incarceration. For example, a future
study can ask participants to reason about a long
time-out (a relatively severe punishment) and, sepa-
rately, a short time-out (a relatively minor punish-
ment). If adults are more pessimistic about the long
(vs. short) time-out, this may suggest that adults
view punishment severity—a key component of
incarceration—as inimical to moral improvement.
Finally, the current work is limited in that it
probed adults’ views of only one process—namely,
severe punishment—as a means for moral improve-
ment. We focused on severe punishment because
this is a common response to perceived moral
transgression, especially in the United States (e.g.,
Alexander, 2012). However, future research can
examine whether less punitive responses to trans-
gression improve perceived moral character. The
current work suggests that adults are pessimistic
about one particularly severe form of punishment
(incarceration). However, it remains unclear
whether adults are pessimistic specifically about
incarceration or about punishment in general.
Recent scholarship provides initial evidence in favor
of the former possibility, showing that 14- to 18-
year-olds view relatively mild forms of punishment
as effective in preventing recidivist behavior (Robi-
chaud & Mageau, 2020). These findings thus pro-
vide initial evidence that, even beyond the
elementary school years, people may view some
forms of punishment as effective in catalyzing
moral improvement.
Such a finding may have important practical
implications. Converging lines of evidence suggests
that severe punishment can negatively affect psy-
chological and physical well-being. For instance,
incarcerated individuals are up to ten times more
likely than non-incarcerated individuals to experi-
ence depression, anxiety, and other trauma-based
Punishment and Moral Change 15
symptoms (Haney, 2012). If people believe that less
punitive responses are also effective in improving
moral character, they may be amenable to support-
ing criminal legal policies that champion alternative
approaches to severe punishment. Thus, under-
standing perceptions of punishment could be an
important component of criminal legal reform.
Conclusion
Uniting work on developmental psychology,
moral cognition, and experimental jurisprudence,
the current research examined children’s and
adults’ views about the impact of punishment on
moral character. Children reported that punishment
—regardless of how severe—catalyzed positive
moral change among “mean” individuals. This
finding suggests that, at times, children’s optimism
can overwhelm their tendency to view moral char-
acter as immutable. Unlike children, adults
expected that “nice” individuals’ positive qualities
worsen following punishment. Further, we did not
find evidence that adults expected punishment to
help “mean” individuals become “nicer.” These
findings marshal evidence suggesting that people in
the United States become increasingly pessimistic
about the impact of punishment on moral character
with age. In doing so, the current work suggests
that adults living in the Unites States may believe
that redemption is not for everyone, or, at the very
least, that a specific form of severe punishment (in-
carceration) is not the way to achieve it.
References
Alexander, M. (2012). The new Jim Crow: Mass incarceration
in the age of colorblindness. New York, NY: The New
Press.
Banks, R. R., Eberhardt, J. L., & Ross, L. (2006). Discrimi-
nation and implicit bias in a racially unequal society.
California Law Review, 94, 1169–1190. https://doi.org/
10.2307/20439061
Bennett, J. (2006). The good, the bad and the ugly: The
media in prison films. The Howard Journal of Criminal
Justice, 45, 97–115. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2311.
2006.00408.x
Bilz, K. (2016). Testing the expressive theory of punish-
ment. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 13, 358–392.
https://doi.org/10.1111/jels.12118
Boseovski, J. J. (2010). Evidence for “rose-colored glasses”:
An examination of the positivity bias in young chil-
dren’s personality judgments. Child Development Per-
spectives, 4, 212–218. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1750-
8606.2010.00149.x
Boseovski, J. J., & Lee, K. (2006). Children’s use of fre-
quency information for trait categorization and behav-
ioral prediction. Developmental Psychology, 42, 500–513.
https://doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.42.3.500
Bregant, J., Shaw, A., & Kinzler, K. D. (2016). Intuitive
jurisprudence: Early reasoning about the functions of
punishment. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 13,
693–717. https://doi.org/10.1111/jels.12130
Bronson, J., & Carson, E. A. (2019). Prisoners in 2017.
Retrieved from https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/
pdf/p17.pdf
Chalik, L., Leslie, S. J., & Rhodes, M. (2017). Cultural con-
text shapes essentialist beliefs about religion. Develop-
mental Psychology, 53, 1178–1187. https://doi.org/10.
1037/dev0000301
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